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Michael Perry believes that, in assessing the legitimacy of judicial
review, one must distinguish sharply between its "interpretive" and
"noninterpretive" aspects. Perry finds no difficulty in claiming legiti-
macy for interpretive review (pp. ii-i9); noninterpretive review is
another matter. Why noninterpretive review - which he sees in every
important constitutional adjudication of human rights questions (p.
i9) - is suspect, and how its legitimacy can be established, constitute
the heart of Perry's concise essay on the theory of American consti-
tutional law.
Judicial review, a longstanding and significant feature of American
government, occurs when a court, in a "case or controversy," passes
upon the constitutionality of governmental action. Judicial review
manifests itself most dramatically when the Supreme Court declares
unconstitutional a statute passed by Congress and signed into law by
the President.
According to Perry:
The Supreme Court engages in interpretive [judicial] review when it
ascertains the constitutionality of a given policy choice by reference
to one of the value judgments of which the Constitution consists ....
The [judicial] effort is to ascertain, as accurately as available historical
materials will permit, the character of a value judgment the framers
constitutionalized at some point in the past .... The Court engages
in noninterpretive review when it makes the determination of consti-
tutionality by reference to a value judgment other than one constitu-
tionalized by the framers. (Pp. io-ii).
Perry is explicit about a limit he imposes on the notion of nonin-
terpretive review. He uses the term when addressing "the legitimacy
of constitutional policymaking (by the judiciary) that goes beyond the
value judgments established by the framers of the written Constitu-
tion" (p. ix). He is "not concerned with the distinct issue of the
legitimacy of constitutional policymaking that goes against the framers'
value judgments" (p. ix). This latter review Perry calls "contracon-
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stitutional" (p. ix). Establishing the legitimacy of contraconstitutional
review might not be possible; surely the effort would have to be heroic.
Some academic lawyers - even some who, like Perry, favor searching
judicial review of human rights questions - have, in their work,
made a distinction similar to the interpretive/noninterpretive distinc-
tion posited by Perry.3 He uses the distinction very differently, how-
ever, and for him it is sharper. He seems much surer of where to
draw the line and is almost stridently insistent upon drawing it.
Unless there is an obligation to make this sharp distinction between
forms of constitutional adjudication, I do not understand why a pro-
ponent of judicial review would make it. It cuts across the grain of
our professional training, for it vastly increases the already difficult
task of justifying judicial review. Perry plainly believes that there is
an obligation to make the distinction - that it is "fundamental" to
constitutional theory (p. io). Beneath this belief lies a particular
conception of adjudication. I shall try to imagine what it might be
and to argue that it, in turn, rests upon a flawed understanding both
of the proper uses of history in adjudication and of the interrelation-
ship of governmental institutions.
If the conception I criticize does not underlie Perry's work, I
confess to be bewildered, for I cannot imagine any other conception
that would drive a theorist to believe that he must distinguish between
interpretive and noninterpretive review. In Perry's case the distinction
not only makes the problem of justifying judicial review much harder,
but also seems, quite understandably, to push Perry into positions
that are inconsistent with his ultimate resolution of that problem.
I.
Let us get at conceptions of adjudication by supposing that the
Constitution is a statute. This means that the Constitution, and ju-
dicial decisions under it, can be amended by Congress. To be sure,
statutory and constitutional adjudication are not the same. But think-
ing first about the former helps one to understand the latter.
When dealing with legislation that is meant to govern vast areas
of life over long periods of time, why would one hold a-conception of
statutory interpretation that demanded a distinction between interpre-
tive and noninterpretive adjudication? 4 The explanation is based on
3 See, e.g., Bork, The Impossibility of Finding Welfare Rights in the Constitution, 1979
WASH. U.L.Q. 695 (objecting to noninterpretive judicial review); Brest, The Misconceived Quest
for the Original Understanding, 6o B.U.L. REv. 204 (i980); Grey, Do We Have an Unwritten
Constitution?, 27 STAN. L. REV. 703 (I975); Sandalow, Constitutional Interpretation, 79 MICH.
L. REv. 1033 (i98i); cf. J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (i980) (leery of, but ultimately
favoring, searching judicial review).
4 "Contrastatutory" adjudication must be distinguished from other kinds of statutory adju-
dication. See G. CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 23-26 (1982)
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two broad and interrelated sets of ideas. The first comprises beliefs
about the certainty of language and the methods of discovering its
meaning. The second is made up of beliefs about the allocation of
institutional responsibilities between legislatures and courts.
An observer insisting on the interpretive/noninterpretive distinc-
tion, who wished to argue that interpretive statutory adjudication
should be the norm, would have to be optimistic about a draftsman's
ability to capture complicated ideas in words with a good deal of
precision. He would have to be optimistic as well about the existence
of a definitive historical record to resolve linguistic ambiguity. This
optimism would have to persist even though the observer knew full
well the realities of the legislative process, including the uses of inten-
tional ambiguity and the purposeful manipulation of what becomes
legislative history. Moreover, the optimism would have to continue
even though the observer recognized, wherever he looked, that the
meaning of a text never remains fixed, that indeed at any time texts
are rich with meanings, and that competing accounts of the past are
attributable to fresh perspectives as well as new information.
The observer who differentiates between interpretivism and non-
interpretivism must be not only optimistic about the clear presentation
of complex ideas, but also apt to embrace a strong version of the
standard distinction between legislation and adjudication: law is made
by duly elected representatives and applied by courts. According to
such an observer, the difference between making and applying the
law is, at its center, a sharp one. And when it is blurred, the courts
should - although I cannot imagine how they could - keep clear of
any action that constitutes an assumption by judges of the legislative
prerogative.
Contrariwise, the observer (like me) who finds it unnecessary to
adopt the interpretive/noninterpretive categories in statutory adjudi-
cation is likely to see the drafting and enactment of a complex statute
as a process radically different from the writing of a document by a
single author. Whatever such an observer believes about understand-
ing single-author texts, he is impressed by the facts that a statute is
the product of negotiation, that negotiation of complex issues usually
leaves major problems unresolved, and that language on which people
of divergent views can agree often must be - to put it euphemistically
- "open textured."
Moreover, although this observer, in his quest for the meaning of
a single-author text, may wonder about the usefulness of attempting
to inquire into the author's intention, he doubts that it is even coherent
to talk about the intention of legislators as a class. And if, for
guidance, he decides to search for legislative intent, he does so know-
(analyzing this reviewer's theory of the nullification of statutes as inconsistent with "legal
topography"). As with "contraconstitutional" adjudication, line-drawing may be difficult.
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ing that this perhaps incoherent thing he seeks will almost surely not
reveal itself in the history of a statute's enactment with sufficient
clarity to become the authoritative source of the statute's meaning.
Of course, he also knows that the statute, not legislative intent or
history, is what legislators enact.
Nor does this observer accept the sharp distinction between mak-
ing and applying law, between legislature and court. Although he
concedes that each institution has discrete functions, he sees the two
engaged in a common enterprise of governing the future wisely. And
because of the adumbrated difficulties inherent in enacting statutes to
control outcomes within the particularist perspectives of concrete
cases, he sees lawmaking as an inevitable and desirable function of
adjudication.
The problem for this observer, therefore, is not how to legitimize
judicial lawmaking, but how to make law properly. This he sees as
the major issue of statutory adjudication. It translates into the fol-
lowing question: what are the sources of law available to a court in
the great cooperative lawmaking enterprise it shares with the legisla-
ture?
II.
I shall return to this question in its constitutional setting. But first
I want to make it clear that, as far as I can tell, Perry does not see
any need to employ an interpretive/noninterpretive distinction in stat-
utory adjudication. In a textual footnote, he writes:
[The] concededly legitimate policymaking functions [exercised by
the judiciary in nonconstitutional cases] are undertaken [in] the judi-
ciary['s] role as delegate of the legislature; whatever policy choices the
judiciary makes in nonconstitutional cases are subject to revision by
the ordinary processes of electorally accountable policymaking. In that
sense, nonconstitutional policymaking by the judiciary is electorally
accountable, even if the judges themselves are not. (P. 28 n.*).
"[E]lectorally accountable policymaking" seems for Perry to be the
factor that makes the interpretive/noninterpretive distinction impor-
tant for constitutional theory. He believes that "[w]e in the United
States are philosophically committed to the political principle that
governmental policymaking . . . ought to be subject to control by
persons accountable to the electorate" (p. 9).
Does the fact that there is more accountability to voters in statutory
than in constitutional adjudication affect the case against the necessity
for an interpretive/noninterpretive distinction in the latter setting? All
of the arguments I have made against the usefulness of the distinction
retain whatever force they may have when the shift is made from
1983]
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statutory to constitutional adjudication. 5 Of course, between the Con-
stitution and the Court stands the legislature. And, to speak Perry's
language, one might suggest that the Constitution delegates nonin-
terpretive questions exclusively to an electorally accountable policy-
making body, and that it does so because giving such power to a
nonelectorally accountable body is simply too dangerous. But that
suggestion presupposes the utility of the distinction between the two
types of judicial review and hence begs the question. If one avoids
begging the question, one finds that the posited delegation to elected
decisionmakers calls into question all judicial review, which after all
is countermajoritarian (that is, weak on accountability to voters) and
therefore requires justification.
III.
I came away from reading The Constitution, the Courts, and
Human Rights believing that Perry's preoccupation with the distinc-
tion between interpretive and noninterpretive review did indeed make
it harder for him to deal with constitutional adjudication in human
rights cases. The problem is that the contrast between the two modes
of review he has imagined is so stark. In the interpretive mode,
judges are on firm ground in applying the "value judgments" of the
framers. If it is not an easy task, at least it is a familiar one, and
when that task is over the judge must have a wonderful sense of
serenity: he has been true to those great men who conceived us in
liberty.
When the judge is in the noninterpretive mode, however, he is at
sea. Where is he "to locate a source of values . . . that can serve as
a reservoir of decisional norms for human rights cases" (p. 97)? Perry,
in advising the Court, first uses "biblical imagery" (p. 98) and then
indicates that, although the metaphors may sound strange, the vision
endures:
The American people still see themselves as a nation standing
under transcendent judgment: They understand . . . that morality is
not arbitrary, that justice cannot be reduced to the sum of the pref-
erences of the collectivity. They persist in seeing themselves as a
beacon to the world, an American Israel, especially in regard to human
rights ("with liberty and justice for all"). And they still value, even
as they resist, prophecy - although now it might be called, for
example, "moral leadership."
The significance of this religious American self-understanding for
our purposes is that it supplies the critical context in which the func-
5 Indeed, because the making or amending of the Constitution requires, respectively, adoption
or ratification by the nation as a whole, the usefulness of intention as a tool for resolving
ambiguity is diminished. See J. ELY, supra note 3, at 16-18.
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tion of noninterpretive review in human rights cases is finally clarified.
Such judicial review represents the institutionalization of prophecy.
The function of noninterpretive review in human rights cases is pro-
phetic; it is to call the American people - actually the government,
the representatives of the people - to provisional judgment. (Pp. 98-
99) (footnotes omitted).
But although such judicial review serves a prophetic function,
prophecy itself is not, I believe, meant to be the "reservoir of deci-
sional norms" (pp. 122-23) - nor, surprisingly, is it the justification
for such review (p. 99). Perry's account here turns on the "essential
claim" that "[n]oninterpretive review in human rights cases has en-
abled us to maintain a tolerable accommodation between, first, our
democratic commitment and, second, the possibility that there may
indeed be right answers - discoverable right answers - to funda-
mental political-moral problems" (p. 102).
I take it to be Perry's view that, if there are "discoverable right
answers," they will reveal themselves more easily to judges than to
legislators (pp. ioo-oi), that these right answers constitute "a reservoir
of decisional norms for human rights cases" (p. 97), and that, accord-
ingly, the Court is to try to make the discovery and to call the
representatives of the people to "provisional judgment" (p. 98).
Two questions come to mind. First, how is this discovery to be
made? Perry tells us: "The ultimate source of decisional norms is the
judge's own values (albeit, values ideally arrived at through, and
tested in the crucible of, a very deliberate search for right answers)"
(p. 123). What if "the judge's own values" are idiosyncratic? Perry's
answer: "Surely there are practical limits to what a judge should say
is constitutionally required or forbidden, his own values notwithstand-
ing" (p. 123).
Second, why is the judgment "provisional"? Perry's answer:
The relationship between noninterpretive review and electorally
accountable policymaking is dialectical. The electorally accountable
political processes generate a policy choice . . . . In exercising non-
interpretive review, the Court evaluates that choice on political-moral
grounds, in the end either accepting or rejecting it. If the Court
rejects a given policy choice, the political process must respond,
whether by embracing the Court's decision, by tolerating it, or, if the
decision is not accepted, or accepted fully, by moderating or even by
undoing it. (P. 112) (footnote omitted).
And what is the method for "moderating" or "undoing" the Court's
decision? What safeguards the principle of electoral accountability in
this dialectical relationship? Perry rejects a number of standard sug-
gestions (pp. 126-28), including "the possibility of amending the Con-
stitution" (p. 127). What he embraces is "the legislative power of
Congress (and the President, who may sign or veto legislation passed
19831
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by Congress) to define, and therefore to limit, the appellate jurisdiction
of the Supreme Court and the original and appellate jurisdiction of
the lower federal courts" (p. 128).
IV.
In further examining the section of Perry's book that I have just
attempted to explicate, I shall, in this Part and the next, limit my
comments to two internal difficulties that I hope are not fatal to his
worthy, if misguided, enterprise. I certainly do not mean, by limiting
my observations in this way, to endorse what I have not attacked.
Indeed, in the final Part of this Review I shall outline a position on
judicial review that either directly or by implication takes issue with
much of what Perry says.
Consider the following elements in Perry's conception of morality
and constitutional adjudication: there may be discoverable right an-
swers "to political-moral problems" (p. 102). Noninterpretive judicial
review in human rights cases is legitimate because courts are institu-
tionally better equipped to search for and discover such answers.
Moreover:
The basic function of that practice is to deal with those political issues
that are fundamental moral problems in a way that is faithful to the
notion of moral evolution (and therefore, to our collective religious
self-understanding) - not simply by invoking established moral con-
ventions [which is what legislatures are apt to do (pp. ioo-oi)] but
by seizing such issues as opportunities for moral reevaluation and
possible moral growth. (P. ioi).
Of course, "the ultimate source of decisional norms is the judge's own
values," but as noted above, Perry believes that "there are practical
limits to what a judge should say is constitutionally required or for-
bidden, his own values notwithstanding" (p. 123).
When the constitutional question is inescapably before the Court,
however - when there exist no other grounds on which to decide the
case and no principled way of declining to decide it - how can the
judge who is certain he has found the right answer possibly suppress
it in favor of the wrong answer simply because the right answer is
startling?6
6 Practical considerations are important in constitutional adjudication, as Alex Bickel has
shown us. See A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH IiI-98 (1962). But Bickel's
"passive virtues" are methods for postponing constitutional decision. On the whole, they relate
to the timing of a decision on the merits. Perry's practical limits are very different: they relate
to the content of a decision on the merits.
Part of Perry's justification for his practical limits is that "the development of constitutional
doctrine should proceed somewhat cautiously and incrementally if the dialectical relationship
between noninterpretive review and the processes of electorally accountable policymaking is to
[VOL. 97:326
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Notice that the issue would evaporate if Perry gave up his belief
that judges are to search for right answers to moral questions -
practical considerations could then limit judicial innovation - or if
he abandoned his view that "the ultimate source of norms is the
judge's own values." But both of these positions are critical to Perry's
notion of morality in constitutional adjudication. 7
Perhaps Perry could give up his admonition that judges should
moderate belief in the right by attention to the practical. That conces-
sion, however, would put an even greater burden on the jurisdictional
trump that Perry has dealt Congress. Unfortunately, as it is, that
card is a joker in Perry's constitutional theory.8
V.
The power of Congress over the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court
is, for Perry, a functional necessity: without it, the "political principle
that governmental policymaking . . . ought to be subject to control
by persons accountable to the electorate" (p. 9) (footnotes omitted)
would be too substantially undermined by the practice of noninterpre-
tive judicial review. The relationship envisioned between such review
and legislation is "dialectical" (p. 112); it involves a "constitutional
dialogue between the Court and the other agencies of government"
(p. 113).
But what kind of dialogue is it in which one participant can silence
the other by cutting out his tongue when offended by his words? Is
that the way to arrive at "discoverable right answers . . . to funda-
mental political-moral problems" (p. 102)?
Of course, as Perry recognizes, "[t]he Court is a fallible institution.
It is capable of giving false prophecy" (p. 115). But in Perry's world,
as far as I can tell, Congress is neither as well equipped as the Court
to know right answers from false prophecy nor constrained to use its
awesome power over jurisdiction against only the latter.
Here, too, Perry could overcome the difficulty if he were to aban-
don his belief that judges are obliged to search for right answers to
moral questions. But that would be to give up everything. He could,
however, substantially modify his position on jurisdiction without
damaging his general theory. That theory would work better - not
be a stable, productive one" (p. 124). But it is difficult to understand how Perry's dialectical
relationship can function at all if the substance of the constitutional decision is different from
what the judge believes is the right answer.
7 At one point, however, Perry reasons that judges should perhaps feel constrained by
community values or predictions of moral progress, and he speculates that peer pressure will
restrain eccentric judges (p. 124).
8 See generally Lupu, Constitutional Theory and the Search for the Workable Premise (Book
Review), 8 DAYTON L. REV. 579, 609-18 (I983) (assessing adequacy of the jurisdictional control
argument). Lupu's article is an interesting, highly critical appraisal of Perry's book.
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well, but better - if the "dialectical relationship" relied on formal
constitutional amendment in cases in which society initially considers
the Court's decision intolerable. Formal constitutional amendment
does continue the dialogue on the merits, in many fora and, generally,
for an extended time.
VI.
Perry rejects reliance on formal constitutional amendment because
of his strong commitment to the concept of "electorally accountable
policymaking" (p. 127). Yet for Perry this concept covers, on one
hand, state and federal legislation, and on the other, judicial law-
making at common law and in statutory interpretation (p. 28 n..).
Indeed, it extends to noninterpretive review by elected state court
judges (p. 131). The concept is so plastic that I wonder whether Perry
is really worried about something else - namely, the finality of Su-
preme Court decisions holding legislation unconstitutional.
In the United States, major decisions are made by individuals and
groups that are well insulated from accountability to voters. But if
not cancellable, these major decisions can at least be modified (some-
times, however, only after a considerable period of time) should they
prove to be publicly indigestible. In this sense, they lack finality.
How, though, does one modify publicly indigestible Supreme Court
decisions? 9
The best way to approach this question, it seems to me, is to
return to my earlier question concerning the sources of law available
to the Court in constitutional cases. One source of law - and it is
of special interest here - is the moral ideals of the community. It is
of interest because it contrasts with the quest for right answers that
Perry would have his Justices pursue. The moral ideals of the com-
munity do not necessarily purport to be right answers.10 They con-
stitute conventional moral obligations and aspirations - particularly
aspirations. For moral aspirations may well receive too little attention
in the accommodations that characterize the legislative process.
The moral ideals of the community are woven into the fabric of
constitutional law in a complex, lawyerly pattern. I have attempted
9 See generally Wellington, The Nature of Judicial Review, 91 YALE L.J. 486 (1982) (pointing
out that "mistaken" constitutional pronouncements can often be amended through normal ju-
dicial processes).
10 I have some reservations about Perry's view that there may be discoverable right answers
to political-moral questions. But even if I were to accept such a view, I would - given our
judiciary and the way judges are selected - emphatically reject his claim that judges are
charged with discovering those answers. Many judges are excellent lawyers and perform superb-
ly on the bench. But there are few who could get away with indulging themselves in Learned
Hand's famous fantasy, which goes something like this: Hand was in heaven and in the company
of a group of intellectual heavyweights who were talking with God about large political-moral
issues. And the Lord said: "Shut up, Plato! I want to hear what Hand has to say."
[Vol. 97:326
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to describe this process elsewhere." It has built into it a prior check
on the conscientious judge. Because the source of law has its roots
in the community, the judge is not apt to reach eccentric positions.
Moreover, the process has its own built-in dynamic of evaluation.
Of course Justices are fallible. But when they make mistakes, they
hear about them: signals are sent, groups are formed, legislation is
proposed, and the public forum is heavily used. New cases will afford
the Court opportunities for reevaluation. The doctrine of stare decisis
is not strong in the constitutional realm.
There are, of course, false signals, and the judicial decision itself
is not neutral in the formation of the community's moral ideals. But
the art of judging involves separating false signals from real mistakes,
whereas the consequences that a judicial decision has for the formation
of moral opinion are completely unpredictable. 12
In the end, judicial review is legitimate for the same reason that
common law and statutory adjudication are legitimate: "We the Peo-
ple" consent. And we do so because we believe that, in one fashion
or another, we have adequate control over the content of the law that
governs us.
1 See Wellington, Common Law Rules and Constitutional Double Standards: Some Notes
on Adjudication, 83 YALE L.J. 221 (1973).
12 The issues raised in the last two paragraphs are examined in some detail in Wellington,
supra note 9, at 509-20.
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